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Bankruptcy Law:
Explaining Bankruptcy Forum Shopping1
Jared Ellias
Forum shopping is one of the most controversial features of
American corporate bankruptcy law. The controversy dates back to
Congress’s decision in 1978 to create a unified court system for both
consumers and businesses in local federal bankruptcy courts.
Acknowledging that this geographically focused system is a clumsy fit
for large firms with operations in many different jurisdictions,
Congress implemented a venue statute that gives most large companies
their choice of several jurisdictions. Over the past thirty years, the
corporate bankruptcy bar has embarked on an ambitious experiment in
forum shopping, effectively rewriting the statute to create two de facto
specialized national-business bankruptcy courts: the District of
Delaware and the Southern District of New York. Why have more than
60% of large firms in recent years chosen to file for bankruptcy in those
two venues?
A large literature has sought to answer this question, chiefly
through case studies and interviews with lawyers. That literature is a
debate between two feuding camps. One camp believes that these two
experienced courts attract firms because they have expert judges and
stores of legal precedent that make bankruptcy more predictable. A
rival camp disputes this explanation, arguing instead that
“predictability” is a cloak for the true, self-interested motivation of the
managers, lawyers, and senior creditors that influence the debtor’s
venue decision. In support of this position, a judge in Texas recently
cast doubt on the value of judicial expertise, pointing out that the
Bankruptcy Act is the same in all jurisdictions. A better explanation,
he implied, was geographic convenience for the New York lawyers and
bankers who dominate corporate bankruptcy practice.2
Which camp is right ought to have a market answer. In a wellfunctioning market, the prices of a bankrupt firm’s financial claims at
the beginning of the bankruptcy process incorporate a large quantity of
information that amounts to an unbiased estimate of the outcome of the

1. Summarized and excerpted from Jared A. Ellias, What Drives
Bankruptcy Forum Shopping? Evidence from Market Data, 47 J. LEGAL STUD.
119 (2018).
2. See In re Crosby Nat’l Golf Club, LLC, 534 B.R. 888 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 2015).
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bankruptcy process and the future value of the firm. If predictable law
and expert judges drive forum shopping, the market should be better at
predicting bankruptcy outcomes in Delaware and the Southern District
of New York than in other jurisdictions. This claim can be tested by
looking for evidence in theoretically unbiased market data.
This chapter summarizes an article that tested this claim with a
new methodology and a hand-collected dataset of 285 large bankrupt
companies linked to the trading-price records of 1,049 financial
contracts (investments characterized as corporate loans, bonds, and
equity). The evidence from this study suggests that the first camp is
right: experience matters.
The data reveal investment returns for traders who buy claims
against a Chapter 11 debtor at the beginning of the bankruptcy process
and receive the bankruptcy payoffs at the end of the case. To illustrate
the test statistic, consider a debtor that borrowed $100 from a bank.
When the company falls into distress, an investor can buy the bank’s
claim at a discount to the face value of the debt. In this example,
suppose the distressed investor bought the claim for 50 cents on the
dollar ($50) and received a payoff at the end of the bankruptcy process
equal to 60 cents on the dollar ($60). This investor earned a 20% return
on her investment, or
.

The squared return is
Importantly, if the investor had sustained a 20% loss, the squared
return would be
Thus, the test statistic measures the “pricing deviation”: The
absolute difference between the market’s recovery expectations at the
beginning of the bankruptcy process and the discounted present value
of the ultimate bankruptcy payoff. All else equal, a low price deviation
suggests that the market’s pricing assumptions were relatively accurate.
The results generally support the view that the market is able to
form more accurate recovery expectations for the firms that reorganize
in the two destination jurisdictions. Under both ordinary least squares
and quantile regression, the data show that filing in Delaware or New
York is associated with a lower pricing deviation than in other
bankruptcy venues. The difference is statistically significant when
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controlling for firm size and industry, the lawyers advising the debtor,
the duration of the bankruptcy case, changes in market conditions over
the bankruptcy period, prepackaged or prenegotiated filings, and other
potential confounding variables. The evidence is highly robust for
Delaware individually, which is statistically significant in all
specifications.
It is possible, though unlikely, that an omitted variable explains the
results. For example, the market may simply be better informed ex
ante about the types of firms that reorganize in the destination courts.
But there does not appear to be an obvious reason why this would be
true. All firms in the sample are large firms without obvious
confounding differences in the distribution of firm industry across the
venue cohorts. Further, the rate of coverage by Wall Street research
analysts—a common proxy variable for market informedness in the
literature—shows no evidence of a pattern that would explain the
results. Alternatively, the firms that reorganize in Delaware and New
York could simply be inherently more predictable firms. But, again,
common proxy variables for firm-specific uncertainty used in other
research, specifically prebankruptcy stock variance and cash flow
volatility, offer no evidence of a systematic difference across the
venue cohorts.
In theory, the influence of predictable law and legal precedent
should be strongest at the beginning of the bankruptcy process. As
the firm moves through the bankruptcy process, the judge will issue
orders, which should diminish uncertainty about the outcome, and the
theoretical benefit of ex ante predictability should diminish.
Consistent with this theoretical expectation, the observed pricing
advantage of New York and Delaware persists in the early part of the
bankruptcy case but dissipates as the case advances deeper into the
plan of reorganization process and as the firm prepares to emerge
from bankruptcy protection. These results suggest that the market’s
observed advantage in pricing accuracy only persists during the
period in which knowledge of law and the judge would appear to
matter the most.
The theoretical losers of increased predictability are the holders of
junior claims. As Chapter 11 firms generally cannot pay their debts in
full, junior claims such as unsecured debt and equity are often
equivalent to out-of-the-money call options on the assets of the
bankruptcy estate, which are more valuable when underlying asset
values are uncertain. Further, junior claimants have incentives to
reduce their expected losses and extract hold-up payments by using
litigation to impose costs and uncertainty on senior creditors. In theory,
then, junior claims are worth less when uncertainty is lower and the
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bargaining leverage that junior claimants expect to acquire through
litigation might be reduced if the law has fewer ambiguities to exploit
and the judge has the experience to filter weak claims. As theory
would suggest, the data show that out-of-the-money claims of
Delaware-venued bankrupt firms appear to be worth relatively less at
the beginning of the Chapter 11 process as compared to claims of firms
reorganizing in less experienced venues, controlling for heterogeneity
in capital structure, market conditions, and the ultimate payoff.3
Importantly, this does not appear to be the result of a transfer of value
from senior creditors. However, I do not find evidence of the same
relationship for the New York-venued sample.
The data do not support the claim that senior claimholders drive
forum shopping for their advantage. The market price of senior claims
at the end of the bankruptcy process does not suggest that bankruptcy
judges in the destination venues disproportionately approve plans of
reorganization that transfer value to senior creditors from junior
claimants. A pro-secured creditor bias (or a pro-management bias)
could, however, be expressed though other channels. While the data
support the views of the proponents of bankruptcy forum shopping, it is
possible that the predictions of both the proponents and detractors of
forum shopping have merit. The data also do not resolve whether the
firms that reorganized elsewhere would have been better off filing for
bankruptcy in a destination venue. The main conclusion is that the
market appears to be better at predicting the outcome of the bankruptcy
process in more experienced bankruptcy courts and that this correlation
is robust to controls and supported by other evidence.

3. In the language of option-pricing theory, the value of the out-of-themoney claim theoretically increases in the volatility of the bankruptcy case.
The results here suggest that the greater certainty of more experienced courts
effectively reduces the volatility of the bankruptcy case, and the pricing
consequences appear to be consistent with what option-pricing theory would
predict.
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Bankruptcy Law:
What is Bankruptcy Claims Trading?1
Jared Ellias
The rise of claims trading is one of the most important changes in
bankruptcy practice over the past thirty years. Many critics fear that
claims trading has made Chapter 11 much harder to administer.
Chapter 11 is built on a model that assumes managers will have lengthy
and contentious negotiations with creditors that culminate in a
consensual settlement and a fully supported plan of reorganization. In
the late 1990s, however, practice began to drift further and further away
from this classic paradigm as, the story goes, a robust secondary market
developed in the debt and equity of Chapter 11 debtors. Some creditors
decided not to negotiate with managers and instead sold their claims to
a new type of investor that both helped to create the secondary market
and grew along with it: distressed hedge funds that specialize in activist
investing in Chapter 11. Over the years, there have been many calls to
change bankruptcy law or practice to accommodate what many see as a
disruptive change.2
This chapter summarizes the first empirical study of the one of the
largest markets for bankruptcy claims: trading in the corporate bonds
issued by Chapter 11 debtors. The study relies on the entire record of
bond trading for all Chapter 11 debtors that filed for bankruptcy
between 2002 and 2012, matched to important dates and case
information from the court dockets. The data source used for the
study—the FINRA TRACE dataset, which is a record of all over-thecounter secondary-market transactions in fixed-income securities, as
reported by FINRA member broker-dealers—has a key limitation.
Consider a hypothetical trade of a small amount of a bond issued by
Debtor prior to Debtor’s bankruptcy. Assume that one hedge fund sells
the right to receive $100 from Debtor to another investor for $10 (or 10
cents on the dollar) on March 1, 2005. The dataset reveals that a trade
of $100 of Debtor’s bond issue happened on March 1, 2005, at the sale
price of $10. It does not, however, reveal the identity of the buyer or
the seller. While this limits the empirical conclusions, the data still
1. Summarized and adapted from Jared A. Ellias, Bankruptcy Claims
Trading, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 772 (2018). This summary was
originally published, with minor alterations, as What is Bankruptcy Claims
Trading? Evidence from Bond Trading, 37 A.B.I. J. (Dec. 2018).
2. See, e.g., Aaron L. Hammer & Michael A. Brandess, Claims Trading:
The Wild West of Chapter 11s, 29 A.B.I. J. (July/August 2010).
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show that the market for Chapter 11 bonds is, though very active,
perhaps less important for the administration of bankruptcy law than
many critics have feared.
The Chapter 11 bond sample consists of all bonds issued by
Chapter 11 debtors that traded while the issuing firm was operating in
Chapter 11: 389,154 individual trades on 54,536 trading days in 494
bonds issued by 204 firms with an aggregate face value of $512 billion
and an aggregate market value of approximately $280 billion. These
bonds often trade at a substantial discount to par, which explains the
difference between the face value and the market value of the trades.
As the numbers suggest, the Chapter 11 bond market is a very large
market.
One important question is how active the market for Chapter 11
debt actually is. While the literature commonly speaks of a “robust”
secondary market, it is also common for courts and commentators to
assume that Chapter 11 debt trades in an “illiquid” market. Obviously,
each descriptions is right some of the time, but the advantage of
empirical approach is that it reveals which is right more often on
average. On average, 94% of Chapter 11 debtors that file for
bankruptcy with outstanding bond debt experience trading in their
bonds while the firm is in Chapter 11. In fact, Chapter 11 bonds are, on
average, among the most heavily traded bonds in the corporate-bond
market as a whole. The median Chapter 11 bond experiences turnover
during the bankruptcy case—where turnover is defined as the total
volume of trading scaled by the face value of the bond—that places it
in the top 15% of all outstanding corporate bonds. In other words, the
median Chapter 11 bond trades more actively than 85% of the
corporate-bond market.
While most Chapter 11 bonds are actively traded, the sample
reveals a wide distribution of trading. For the median bond, aggregate
trading is equivalent to more than 113% of the outstanding face value
of the bond between the petition date and the approval of a plan of
reorganization. This is not to say that 113% of petition-date holders of
the bond sold their claim to a new investor. Because the dataset does
not reveal the identity of the traders, it cannot distinguish between, for
example, three trades of approximately 40% of the issue, with the other
60% held by a patient investor, or 113% of the bond issue traded once.
The tails of the distribution are very different than the median, with the
25th percentile bond only seeing 27% aggregate turnover and the 75th
percentile bond seeing more than 345% aggregate turnover during that
same period. Thus, while the majority of Chapter 11 cases involve
heavy trading, the level of trading in the most actively traded bonds is
qualitatively different from the median case.
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Trading also appears, on average, to be the heaviest at the
beginning of the bankruptcy case. On average, 3% of an outstanding
bond issue trades on every trading day between a firm’s petition date
and the approval of DIP financing. Trading drops sharply, to about 1%
of the outstanding bond issue, for every day of the case subsequent to
the approval of DIP financing, and the average level of trading falls
again once the disclosure statement is approved. This pattern of trading
suggests that, on average, the market for Chapter 11 debt is most active
relatively early in the bankruptcy process.
An interesting pattern in the data is that trading across levels of a
firm’s capital structure is relatively uncorrelated. To illustrate, consider
a firm with senior bonds and subordinated bonds. In general, the level
of trading in the senior bonds does not predict the level of trading in the
subordinated bonds, and vice versa. On the other hand, when multiple
bond issues are outstanding at the same level of claim priority—two
issues of senior unsecured bonds, for example—trading in those bonds
is highly correlated. This pattern suggests that traders tend to focus on
one level of a firm’s capital structure at any given time. Interestingly,
trading in the bonds that receive a distribution of equity at the end of
the bankruptcy case does not appear to be statistically significantly
heavier than in bonds that receive a distribution of cash or debt.
The results presented above show that there is an active market for
the claims of Chapter 11 debtors, but they do not answer an important
question: how much value (if any) are claimholders giving up by
selling their claims? The classic story of bankruptcy claims trading
involves the sale of claims issued by bankrupt firms from traditional
institutional investors to nontraditional investors, such as hedge funds,
with expertise in bankruptcy. If the result of this trade involves a
systematic transfer of value to specialized risk-bearers, perhaps the
liquidity provided to prebankruptcy creditors presents something of a
trade-off.
Investigating how selling claimholders fare required studying a
subsample of claims priced around the petition date and near plan
confirmation to measure the market value of the distribution the
claimholder receives under the plan of reorganization. The marketadjusted returns for the claim buyer can be calculated by assuming the
seller reinvests the proceeds of the sale in an S&P 500 index fund on
the same day she sold her claim and sold the index fund on the day the
plan was confirmed.
The graph below shows the percentage of trades resulting in profit,
by the year the firm filed for bankruptcy. For purposes of this graph,
each bond in the dataset is equally weighted and the y-axis shows the
percentage of all Chapter 11 bonds issued by firms that filed for
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Percentage of Claims Resulting in Market-Adjusted
Profits for Buyer on Petition Date
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bankruptcy in each sample year that resulted in a market-adjusted profit
for the buyer. For example, 80% of the Chapter 11 bonds that traded
around the petition date for the firms that filed for bankruptcy in 2002
offered market-adjusted profits to the buyer if she bought the claim on
the petition date and sold it at the end of the bankruptcy process for the
then-market price.

2002

2004

2006
2008
Petition Year

2010

2012

As a threshold matter, the buyers of claims at the beginning of the
bankruptcy process do better than a selling claimholder only about 61%
of the time. The data also appear to show that hypothetical petitiondate buyers do better than sellers when the economy is emerging from
recessions, while sellers do better than buyers when the economy is
doing well. This is consistent with distressed-debt hedge funds bidding
down returns in good times, while the sheer supply of distressed debt in
bad times leads to large profits for skilled investors.
None of the evidence so far answers perhaps the most important
question of all: What does all this activity mean for bankruptcy
governance? After all, bankruptcy law is not terribly concerned with
arms-length trades in bankruptcy claims and whether buyers or sellers
do better more often. What actually matters is how those trades affect
the way Chapter 11 is administered. Managers do not generally
negotiate with all of the holders of a bond issue; instead, they negotiate
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with the activist investors who seek to influence the bankruptcy case.
While some large investors may buy all of a bond issue on their own,
for the most part groups of funds participate in the bankruptcy case
together as “ad hoc groups.” Bankruptcy Rule 2019 requires these ad
hoc groups to file disclosure statements identifying, among other
things, the names of the group members and how much they held. Rule
2019 also requires ad hoc groups to file amended disclosure statements
when their composition and holdings change.
The Rule 2019 statements reveal how ad hoc groups change over
the course of Chapter 11.3 The sample consists of 100 initial
statements, of which the median statement was filed 42 days into the
bankruptcy case—on average, around the time that DIP financing was
approved.4 Of these initial 100 groups, 42 of them never filed an
updated Rule 2019 statement. Of the groups that did file updates, the
changes to group composition and holdings tended to be relatively
slight; very few groups changed in a material way over the course of
Chapter 11. For the updating groups, the group members from the
original Rule 2019 statement held, on average, 86% of the debt held by
the final group in the last statement filed with the court, showing that
the initial group members nearly always remained in control of the ad
hoc group by the end of the case. Ad hoc groups tended not to acquire
new members, and the existing members rarely bought additional debt
during the bankruptcy case.5
This finding presents a puzzle: How is the heavy level of trading in
bond debt consistent with the fact that ad hoc groups tend to enter early
and seldom change very much by the end of the case? One hypothesis
is that the claims trading during the bankruptcy case is much more
about passive speculation than it is about influencing the outcome of
the bankruptcy case. In other words, claims trading is less a route for
activist entrance and exit and more an opportunity for non-activist

3. This method certainly misses the cases where one hedge fund owns
nearly all of the bond issue and acts on its own, outside of the scaffolding of an
ad hoc group. However, those cases are relatively rare, and the case where that
one investor then sells to another single investor are probably rarer still, so it is
unlikely that this biases the overall findings in a way that renders them
unreliable.
4. There was a slight lag between the ad hoc group’s initial appearance in
the case (on average, 24 days after the petition date) and the filing of a Rule
2019 statement (on average, 42 days after the petition date), so most groups
were probably active and negotiating earlier than the initial Rule 2019
disclosure.
5. The Rule 2019 statements filed by ad hoc groups holding loans (101
groups) showed the same pattern of group stability.
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investors to make passive investments. Of course, some of those nonactivist funds might have the ability to become activists if necessary to
defend their claims. Moreover, the mere existence of a claims-trading
market clearly casts a shadow on the bankruptcy bargaining table.
Additionally, the composition of creditor groups on the petition date
probably reflects claims trading that occurred prior to the firm’s
Chapter 11 filing, meaning that claims trading is still important for
bankruptcy governance. However, the results in this study cast doubt
on the argument that new regulation is needed to deal with the churn
created by claims trading during the Chapter 11 case itself—there
appears to be less churn than was previously understood.

